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Abstract: 
This paper analyzes Colorado Corn producers’ preferences over both private- and environmental 
public-good production system attributes. Current production practices are characterized by 
intensive water and chemical use, resulting in non-point source pollution to water bodies as well 
as soil erosion problems. Data from a stated preference survey are employed to analyze key 
attributes of experimentally configured irrigation systems, proposed as alternatives to current 
practices. Panel mixed logit estimations find positive preferences for profit, risk reduction, and, 
importantly, systems with less environmental impact in terms of nitrate leaching and soil erosion. 
The results also find presence of significant preference heterogeneity and a complementary 
relationship between the two environmental attributes. Analysis of this kind can be used by 
policy makers to predict behavioral responses associated with introduction of new technologies, 
or to assess welfare implications of agricultural policy changes and stricter environmental 
regulations. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Do producers care about their environmental impacts? The canonical microeconomic 
model of the firm would suggest “no” by assuming strict profit maximization. 
However, multiple strands of economic literature have challenged this view 
(Johnson, 1966; Baumol, 1967; Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972; Court and Woods, 
1970; Lin, Dean, and Moore, 1974; Navarro, 1988; van Kooten, Weisensel, and 
Chinthammit, 1990; Foltz et al., 1995). A broader and more realistic view of the firm 
permits consideration of multiple management objectives or production system 
attributes.
1 Many non-profit objectives or attributes may have dynamic implications 
for future profits, whereas for other ones, this may not be the case. For example, 
some producers may contemporaneously maximize sales such as to increase market 
shares or market power, with expectation of positive impacts on future profits 
(Williamson, 1966). Another example is green production, where the supply of more 
environmentally-friendly products into markets can either command future price 
premiums, or be a way for a producer to build social capital for the purpose of 
attaining an overall favorable standing with consumers (Innes, 2006; Moraga-
Gonzalez and Padron-Fumero, 2002; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Andreoni, 1990; 
Nyborg and Rege, 2003).  
                                                 
1 In this paper the terms “objective” and “attribute” or “feature” are used interchangeably. 
The term attribute is typically used in the literature on consumers’ preferences for marketed 
and non-market economic goods that can be viewed as an attribute bundle (Lancaster, 
1971). Similarly, agricultural production can be viewed from a multi-attribute or multi-
production objective perspective, with each attribute of the production process carrying 
some weight in the farmer’s management decisions. 
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In other cases, profit inertia is not so obvious. For instance, if the distinction 
between owners, shareholders, and management is blurred or overlapping, decision-
making agents may bring personal motivations into the firm management processes, 
such as a desire to contribute to public goods, conform to social norms (e.g., to avoid 
social stigmatization as socially irresponsible), attain social status, and other non-
pecuniary motivations proposed in consumer choice contexts (Andreoni, 1990; 
Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Brock and Durlauf, 2001; Brekke, Kverndokk, and 
Nyborg, 2003; Nyborg and Rege, 2003). In the case of agricultural production, it is 
likely that both fully privately appropriable benefits and costs, and attributes of 
production with social and environmental implications (impacting quasi-public 
goods such as soil and water) are being considered by farmers.  In addition to the 
impacts on profit or risk, the concern over these attributes may be triggered by 
increased self-awareness as well as public scrutiny regarding negative externalities 
associated with modern agriculture (Foltz et al., 1995; van Kooten, Weisensel, and 
Chinthammit, 1990; Hayashi, 2000; Moran, et al., 2007).
2   
The overall goal of this paper is to provide an empirical contribution to the 
literature on multiple producer objectives by analyzing the extent to which 
agricultural producers incorporate environmental considerations into their 
management decisions. Towards this goal, the paper presents an analysis of the 
preferences of a particular sub-set of agricultural producers (Colorado corn farmers), 
with a focus on the salient environmental public-good attributes of their production 
                                                 
2 Multiple-objectives in agricultural production are studied in, for example, Foltz et al. 
(1995), Rehman and Romero (1993), Hayashi (2000), Brodt, Klonsky, and Tourte (2006), 
Poe (1999), and Basarir and Gillespie (2006).  
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practices. Specifically, corn production is characterized by intense water and 
chemical usage, resulting in water pollution problems as well as soil erosion that can 
severely damage natural aquatic-environments (Page, 1997).
3 The data employed 
come from a stated preference survey that elicited contingent ratings of 
experimentally configured irrigation systems, proposed as alternatives to current 
practices. These alternative systems were framed in terms of four explicit attributes - 
per acre profits, crop-loss risk, nitrate leaching, and soil erosion - with the former 
two considered strictly private attributes and the latter two intended to capture 
environmental attributes within the empirical context.
4  
Stated preference methods have their origins in the environmental valuation, 
marketing, and transportation literatures, and are based on the theoretically-
consistent random utility model (Luce, 1959; McFadden, 1974; Louviere, Hensher, 
and Swait, 2000). The novelty of these methods is their ability to generate estimates 
of the value of goods and their attributes about which markets produce imperfect (or 
no)  revealed preference information. In this paper’s empirical context, these 
methods are particularly useful as the choices farmers make with respect to non-
profit aspects in actual management decisions are not directly observable, nor is it 
likely that revealed preference data would, if available, exhibit sufficient quasi-
experimental variation in production attributes. By using a stated preference 
                                                 
3 Agricultural producers may care about environmental aspects of production for a variety of 
reasons, including potential profit inertia, through the non-pecuniary motivations mentioned 
above, or simply by deriving utility from the environmental quality of the farm. 
4 Detailed discussions of the environmental impact of Colorado corn production can be 
found in Dennehy, et al. (1998), USDA-NRCS (1996), and Sprague, Kimbrough, and 
Ranalli (2002). 
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approach, however, this paper is able to identify the trade-offs between private and 
quasi-public objectives. Furthermore, because of the central importance of irrigation 
usage in corn production, it is possible to frame the experimental elicitation of 
preferences in a realistic and unambiguous way; to wit, through hypothetical 
changes in irrigation systems, while holding constant management aspects that in 
actuality could be confounding or endogenous (e.g., as such input usage choices).
5 
Lastly, since the goal is to investigate the existence of multiple production objectives, 
it is natural to adopt the same random utility model framework employed in 
consumer choice analysis, which degenerates to strict profit maximization, if per 
acre profits is the only attribute found to be of significance.  
While stated preferences methods are common in analyses of consumer 
preferences for both new (or re-configured) market good and non-market goods and 
services, these methods have not been widely utilized in producer studies. A few 
exceptions are Hudson and Lusk (2004) who perform an experiment related to 
producer contracting, Birole, Smale, and Gyovai (2006) who use choice experiments 
to estimate Hungarian farmers’ preferences for agro-biodiversity, and Siikamaki and 
Layton (2006) who study Finish forest owners’ willingness to participate in 
biodiversity conservation programs. Hence, a major contribution of this paper is to 
offer a rare example of the usefulness of employing a stated preference approach in 
producer choice settings.  
                                                 
5 Experimental framing is one of the most important challenges in stated preference survey 
design. At the same time, the ability to experimentally hold constant things that are not of 
primary research focus is one of the major advantages of stated preference methods relative 
to revealed preference methods (Louviere, Hensher, and Swait, 2000; Ajzen, Brown, and 
Rosenthal, 1996).   
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As such, the research objectives and concomitant contributions to the 
economics literature of this paper are to: 1) analyze producer preferences over 
multiple production system attributes, 2) investigate the extent to which agricultural 
producers have preferences for reducing their environmental impacts, and 3) 
illuminate the usefulness of stated preference methods in producer analysis. 
Furthermore, the analysis implements the most advanced discrete choice 
econometric technique, namely, the panel mixed logit model with correlated 
parameters (Train, 2003). Lastly, by recovering the monetary part-worth of attributes, 
their implied trade-offs, and quantifying preference heterogeneity, the results should 
be of great interest to policy makers who wish to investigate the impacts of 
voluntary or mandated adoption of new technologies through agricultural policy 
changes or stricter environmental regulations. 
 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the 
empirical context and the survey data. Subsequently, the conceptual framework and 
empirical models are presented, followed by a section discussing econometric results. 
The last section offers concluding remarks, points out limitations of the analysis, and 
suggests extensions for future research.   
 
2. EMPIRICAL SETTING AND THE STATED PREFERENCE DATA 
  The study area, namely the South Platte River Valley Basin and  the  Irrigated 
Plains, is characterized by diverse soil types, land uses, and other natural and 
human-modified features such as streambanks and vegetation, which likely influence 
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environmental impacts of agricultural production (Dennehy, et al., 1998). 
Nevertheless, a large percentage of water quality degradation is a result of 
agricultural production, and pesticides, nitrate, and sediment have been detected in 
both surface and groundwater (USDA NRCS, 1996; Dennehy, et al., 1998). Siltation 
of stream beds is strongly related to soil erosion, and reduces surface water quality 
through a combination of sediment deposition and nutrient loading (USDA NRCS, 
1996). Contaminated areas are typified by irrigated corn monoculture on well to 
excessively well drained soils (USDA NRCS, 1996).  
In light of these considerations, this study includes nitrate leaching and soil 
erosion as environmental attributes in the definition of hypothetical irrigation 
systems used in the stated preference survey. Specifically, multiple irrigation 
systems consisting of four attributes each (profits, risk, nitrate leaching, and soil 
erosion) were defined using an incomplete six block orthogonal fractional-factorial 
design obtained from the software SAS (see Louviere, Hensher, and Swait, 2000 for 
experimental design methods). Each attribute was defined as one of three possible 
levels (low, medium, or high) for each system, developed in conjunction with 
experts in the Soil and Crop Science and Agricultural and Resource Economics 
departments at Colorado State University, and respondents were randomly assigned 
to a block corresponding with a unique survey. For the private attributes, profits (P) 
was described as dollar increases on returns per acre over cost, while the risk (R) 
was defined as the percentage chance that at least half of the corn crop would be lost. 
For the environmental attributes, nitrate leaching (N) was described in pounds per 
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acre, whereas the soil erosion (E) was defined in terms of tons of soil per acre.  
Details on the experimental design are summarized in Table 1.  
Relative preferences for the hypothetical irrigation systems were elicited 
through a contingent rating format.
6 Respondents were presented with six alternative 
irrigation system configurations, and asked to rate each of them relative to their 
current situation. The rating scale went from 1 (signifying strong preference for the 
current situation) to 10 (implying strong preference for the hypothetical system). In 
providing their ratings, the participants were asked to assume a current profit level of 
$100 per acre, which correspond approximately to the mean profit level at the time. 
However, pre-testing the survey questionnaire suggested that it was not feasible to 
assume average baseline levels for the non-profit attributes. Furthermore, pre-testing 
also suggested that it would not be meaningful to elicit these baseline levels from 
each farmer. As a result, the main analysis presented below does not use the current 
system as an alternative. Instead, the results are conditional on a system change, that 
is, they represent the farmers preferences provided changes to current practices had 
to be made (e.g., through agricultural policies changes or new environmental 
regulations). Basic background information, such as socioeconomic, management, 
and institutional variables, including acres of corn irrigated, farming experience, soil 
type, irrigation water source, education level, and credit availability, was also 
collected. 
                                                 
6 A choice experiment approach was initially considered, but deemed too time-consuming in 
a producer survey. The contingent rating approach has the advantage of generating more 
preference information with fewer questions, with the draw-back that responses must be re-
interpreted to be consistent with true economic choices. 
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Data was collected in a mail-mode survey targeted to center-pivot irrigated 
corn farmers in Northeastern Colorado (Page, 1997). The sampling frame consisted 
of 344 possible center pivot irrigated farm operators who grow corn, with addresses 
obtained from the Colorado Department of Agriculture. The survey was 
implemented according to the Total Design Method (Dillman, 1978), and resulted in 
a response rate of approximately 33%, after accounting for invalid addresses.  
Summary statistics are presented in Table 2. Briefly, the average farmer had 
close to 500 acres, making a profit of about $100 per acre, with a yield of 160 
bushels per acre. Most respondents were farm owners (88%) with significant 
farming experience (about 30 years of farm work and 27 years of irrigation practice, 
on average). About half of the respondents held at least a high school degree and 
most (80%) stated they had access to at least some credit. The most commonly 
indicated soil types were mixed sand-loam or loamy soil. The average reported well-
depth was 118 feet.  
 
3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
The empirical analysis converts the contingent ratings into ordinal pair-wise 
preference comparisons, or so-called pseudo-choice observations. With six ratings, 
this data-reconstruction yields a maximum of fifteen informationally non-redundant 
observations per respondent.
7  The ratings, and resulting pair-wise comparisons, are 
                                                 
7 These are called pseudo-choices since the survey did not actually ask respondents to make 
choices between pairs of irrigation systems. Instead, it is assumed that the same ordinal 
preference revelations would result from such an exercise. See MacKenzie (1993), Swallow 
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assumed generated from a conditional indirect utility function that depends explicitly 
on the four attributes included in the stated preference survey: 
(1)  (,, ,) , Uv P R N E =  
where the reader is reminded that P, R, N, and E represent profits, crop-loss risk, 
nitrate leaching, and soil erosion, respectively.
8 Utility is expected to be increasing 
in profits, decreasing in risk, and potentially decreasing in the environmental 
attributes, and it is assumed that the respondent prefers the system that offers 
maximum overall utility. The model is made operational by choosing a linear first-
order functional form approximation to the true function and recognizing 
unobservable factors with an additive error term.
9 This leads to a random utility 
model that can be stated formally as: 
(2)  12 3 4 , njk n njk n njk n njk n njk njk UP RNE β βββε =++ + +  
where  is total utility to farmer n from irrigation system j in comparison k, which 
has a deterministic component 
njk U
12 3 4 njk n njk n njk n njk n njk vPRNE β βββ = +++ and a 
random component  njk ε assumed to be independent and identically distributed (IID) 
type I extreme value. The n subscript on the coefficients recognizes that different 
farmers are likely to place different weights on the attributes. To account for this 
heterogeneity in estimation, a density function  (|) g β θ   will be specified, where 
                                                                                                                                          
Opaluch, and Weaver (2001), Siikamaki (2000), and Layton and Lee (2003) for different 
ways to use rating data in estimation. 
8 Here, we treat risk as a non-monetary attribute. Appendix 2 presents the results of a model 
in which implied expected profits and variance of profits variables are assumed as 
covariates. 
9 In the empirical results section, we discuss other specifications that were explored. 
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1234 (,,,) β ββββ = and θ  is a vector of parameters that characterizes this function 
(typically coefficient means, variances, and possibly co-variances).
10  
  The distributional assumption on the random component leads to a binary 
logit expression for the probability that alternative 1 is preferred to alternative 2 in 















 Furthermore,  let  1 ( ,..., )
n nn n K yy y = , represent the sequence of preferred 
alternatives (1  or  2) by farmer n across the Kn pair-wise comparisons. These 
observations are independent conditional on individual-specific utility coefficients 
, n β  so their joint probability can be expressed as a product of probabilities: 
(4)  1 ( | ) ( | ) ... ( | ).
n nn n n n K n Py Py Py β ββ = ⋅⋅  
In practice, these coefficients are of course unknown so that it will be necessary to 
integrate (4)over all possible coefficient values using the specified density 
function (|) g β θ , which yields the canonical panel mixed logit probability (Train, 
2003): 
(5)  (| ) (| )( | ) nn Py Py g d . θ ββ θ =⋅ ∫ β
                                                
 
 
10 Given the generic, experimental nature of the irrigation systems presented in the survey, 
there is no need to include alternative-specific constants in the estimations. 
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Since (5) does not have  closed-form solution it must be approximated through 
simulation, which is achieved by taking R draws of β  from  (|) g β θ and computing 





n r Py Py
R
. n θ β = ∑  11  
  The mixed logit model is implemented by giving specific structure to the 
function  (|) g β θ . First, coefficients to be estimated as random must be chosen. 
Second, statistical distributions must be specified for these coefficients (Train 2003; 
Hensher and Greene 2003). A full random coefficient specification is virtually 
unidentified (Ruud 1996). As such, it has become typical to keep the money 
coefficient fixed, in our case, the coefficient on per acre profit P (see, for example, 
Revelt and Train, 1998, Layton and Brown, 2000, Goett, Hudson, and Train, 2002; 
and Hensher, Shore, and Train, 2005). This practice is not restrictive when the 
ultimate interest lies in identifying heterogeneity in the marginal monetary value, 
also called “part-worth”, of non-monetary attributes, as opposed to heterogeneity in 
the utility coefficients per se. Furthermore, it makes it easy to interpret the implied 
part-worth distributions.  
With regard to coefficient distributions, the most common practice is to 
assume coefficients are distributed independently normal. Normality is flexible in 
that it permits attributes to be both positively and negatively valued. While one 
would typically expect the non-profit attributes (risk, nitrate leaching, and soil 
                                                 
11 Specifications issues, simulation procedures, and model properties, are discussed fully in 
Train (2003) and Hensher and Green (2003). The parsimonious mixed logit exposition given 
here loosely follows that of Hensher, Shore, and Train (2005). 
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erosion) to be non-positively valued by the farmers, we let the estimation predict the 
distribution mass in anticipated sign-region for each of these attributes, as an 
informal data validity test.  
  In the next section, models with and without independence between the 
random coefficients are presented. In the more flexible case that allows correlations 

















⎢ ⎥ Ω= ⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
 
Note that when all elements of  β Ω are zero, the model becomes the standard fixed 
coefficient logit. This special case is very restrictive in that it imposes independence 
of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), ignores preference heterogeneity, and fails to account 
for the panel nature of the data (Train, 2003). Furthermore, when the off-diagonal 
elements of the matrix are zero, the random coefficients are independent, which, in 
our case, means the weight a farmer places on any one non-profit attributes is 
independent of preferences for the other attributes. This restriction might be 
unrealistic in our context. Since nitrate leaching (N) and soil erosion (E) both 
represent environmental impacts of corn production, one might expect that a farmer 
who cares more about one of these attributes also cares more about the other. The 
sign of the correlation between risk and the environmental variables, however, is an 
empirical question.
12  
                                                 
12 Preference relationships between attributes can also be explored through the use of 
interaction variables. Unfortunately, our stated preference survey was not developed to 
ensure identification of coefficients on such variables. Nevertheless, we were able to 
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  Estimation of the covariance matrix is achieved through a Cholesky 
decomposition of the form  , where  ' β Ω= Γ Γ Γis a lower triangular Cholesky matrix. 
Specifically, in simulating (6), random draws for β are taken as  where 
_
, e ββ =+ Γ
_
β   is the mean vector of the multivariate normal coefficient distribution 
_
(, ) MVN β β Ω and e is a vector of standard normal covariates. The lower triangular 










⎢ ⎥ Γ=⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦
  
which is estimated along with 
_
β  through the simulation procedure.
13
 
4. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
Primary Results 
Results using the specification in (2) are reported in Table 3. Model 1 is a fixed 
coefficient logit, whereas Model 2 is a mixed logit with uncorrelated normally 
distributed random coefficients, and Model 3 is a mixed logit with multivariate 
normal coefficients. The non-profit attributes were entered negatively (multiplied by 
-1) such that their expected coefficient signs are now positive. In addition, the profit 
                                                                                                                                          
estimate some model specifications with a fixed coefficient interaction term for nitrate 
leaching and soil erosion, which we discuss in the next section and report in appendices.   
13 The panel mixed logit models in the next section were estimated by simulated maximum 
likelihood procedures in NLOGIT 4.0 using 500 Halton draws. The advantages of using 
Halton draws instead of random draws are discussed in Train (2003). 
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and nitrate leaching variables were re-scaled (by factors of 1/10 and 1/100, 
respectively) to facilitate easier convergence of the simulated maximum likelihood 
routine.  
  As the three models are naturally nested, one can test the various restrictions 
of (7) using standard likelihood ratio tests. As expected, the fixed coefficient logit 
model, which does not account for preference heterogeneity and multiple 
observations per respondent, is vastly inferior to the random parameters models, 
with a test statistic of 125.67, distributed chi-squared with three degrees of freedom. 
Furthermore, the test between the two mixed logit models suggests that permitting 
correlated coefficients yields superior statistical results, with LR test statistic of 
12.39 exceeding the  critical value of 7.82. Thus, we conclude that there is 
preference heterogeneity across respondents. 
) 3 (
2
05 . 0 χ
  The first four rows of parameters in Table 3 represent the mean of 
preferences across all individuals in the sample. The estimates are positive and 
highly significant in all three models, suggesting that farmers, on average, obtain 
positive utility from profit, dislike risk, and prefer irrigation systems with less nitrate 
leaching and soil erosion, all else equal. In the mixed logit models, the estimated 
diagonal Cholesky matrix parameters (S11, S22, and S33) are all statistically significant, 
which suggest that preferences for the non-profit attributes vary across farmers. In 
Model 3, the off-diagonal Cholesky elements (S21, S31, and S32) are jointly significant 
(as indicated by the LR test between Model 3 and Model 2 described above). 
However, while S32 is strongly significant, it should be noted that S31 is only 
marginally significant and S21 is insignificant. The signs of these parameters give the 
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directions of preference coefficient dependence. The negative sign on S31 indicates 
that farmers with relatively high risk tolerance tend to dislike soil erosion more, and 
vice-versa. The positive sign on S32 indicates that nitrate leaching and soil erosion, 
the two production attributes with environmental public good implications, are 
preference complements in the sense that preference intensities for these attributes 
across farmers move in the same direction. Relative magnitudes of these correlations 
can be seen in Table 4, which reports the implied covariance and correlation 
matrices. As seen in the latter, the negative relationship between risk and soil erosion 
is relatively modest (a correlation of -0.46), whereas the positive relationship 
between nitrate leaching and soil erosion is more pronounced (correlation of 
+0.64).
14
  The monetary part-worth for a non-profit attribute is given by the ratio of its 
coefficient to the coefficient on profit, where the latter represent marginal utility of 
money. For example, the mean part-worth for risk reduction is given by  21 / β β  
(after appropriately accounting for the re-definition and re-scaling of the attribute 
variables described above). Given that the profit coefficient was maintained as fixed, 
the part-worth distribution for an attribute has the same characteristics as the 
distribution of the attribute’s utility coefficient.  
                                                 
14 The signs and significance levels of the diagonal Cholesky parameters are stable across 
different number of random draws and the methods of taking these draws (random versus 
Halton). In contrast, the off-diagonal parameter estimates are less robust across such 
variations (but more stable when more than 300 Halton draws are used), and should 
therefore be cautiously interpreted. 
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Table 5 reports mean and standard deviation of the marginal values of 
reducing risk by one percent (in per acre terms), a one pound reduction in nitrate 
leaching, and a one ton reduction in soil erosion. Using Model 3, the part-worth of a 
1% reduction in risk is $0.50 at the mean, and has a standard deviation about $0.45. 
This estimate seems reasonable. The average farmer in the sample had about 500 
acres of productive land. An average profit of $100 per acre, would suggest total 
profits of $50,000. A 1% probability of loosing half the crop on this land size 
implies expected profits of $49,750, a difference of $250, or $0.50 per acre (which 
matches the estimated mean value of reducing risk by 1%).  
Turning to the two environmental public good attributes, reducing nitrate 
leaching has a mean value of $0.31 per pound and a standard deviation of $0.25, 
whereas a 1 ton reduction in soil erosion has a mean value and standard deviation of 
$7.06 and $4.38, respectively. Note that the standard deviations imply significant 
heterogeneity in the sample. Nevertheless, as can be seen in Table 6, the implied 
probabilities of having preferences in line with a priori expectations (a positive 
valuation of less risk, and non-positive valuations of nitrate leaching and soil 
erosion) are high, and serves as an informal validation of the survey. Model 3 results 
suggest that 87% prefer less risk, 89% prefer less nitrate leaching, and 95% prefer 
less soil erosion, all else equal and using the unconditional coefficient results. T 
This finding is reinforced from the conditional (or individual-specific) 
coefficient results. These coefficients can be extracted by applying a Bayesian 
procedure that utilizes parameter estimates and all available data, including choice 
information (see Hensher and Greene, 2003 for details). This leads to the prediction 
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that 92% like less risk and virtually everyone like less nitrate leaching and soil 
erosion (approximately 97% in both cases).  
  The part-worth discussion above is based on point estimates of preference 
distribution parameters produced by the econometric estimation. But as is well 
known, models estimated by maximum likelihood are non-linear which means the 
statistical error of any one parameter estimate is correlated with the statistical errors 
of all other parameter estimates. A robust full-information characterization of the 
part-worth distributions can be obtained through simulation procedures described in 
Hensher and Greene (2003).
15 For completeness, Table 7 reports full-information 
simulation results for the statistically superior Model 3. 
  
Alternative Model Specifications and Robustness Checks 
Several other model specifications were estimated as part of preliminary data 
examination and robustness checks for the models reported in Table 3.  
  First, the survey collected background information, which has the potential 
for enriching the empirical model specifications. For example, one may expect that 
larger land-holders would be more sensitive to the type of financial risk described, 
and possibly also to profits. One may also expect that secondary (off-farm) income 
would be associated with less sensitivity to these private attributes. Other hypotheses 
could be formulated as well. Several specifications were therefore explored that 
permitted background variables to be either interacted with attributes or shifting the 
                                                 
15 This method is similar to the method for simulating elasticities described in Krinsky and 
Robb (1986). 
  18 
mean of random coefficient distributions. Unfortunately, these estimations did not 
improve statistical properties or yield additional insights.  
  Second, models were estimated wherein one or several of the random 
coefficients were specified as log-normally distributed (instead of normally 
distributed), based on a priori expectations about the qualitative effects of attributes 
on utility. These specifications did not change qualitative findings, nor did they 
significantly affect the part-worth analysis.
16  
  Third, models where attribute levels entered the utility function piece-wise 
linearly, a flexible way of testing for non-linearity, were estimated (Layton and 
Brown, 2000). Results from these models were more difficult to interpret and 
generally weaker in terms of generating insights into the farmers’ preferences.
17
  Fourth, models were explored with attribute interaction terms. In general, 
these models did not perform well, most likely because the experimental design was 
non-orthogonal with respect to identification of interaction effects.
18 However, 
Model 3 was extended to include a fixed coefficient interaction variable for nitrate 
leaching and soil erosion (see Table A1 of Appendix 1). The results are qualitatively 
similar, and re-enforce the complementary relationship between the two 
                                                 
16 Log-normal coefficient distribution would restrict risk, nitrate leaching, and/or soil 
erosion, respectively, to be strictly negatively valued. The shape of a part-worth distribution 
with log-normal coefficient on a non-profit variable is itself log-normal (with fixed profit 
coefficient). 
17 Specific alternative model estimations can be reproduced and made available upon 
request. 
18 See Louveiere, Hensher, and Swait (2000) for optimal experimental design. 
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environmental public good attributes, as both the interaction term and the Cholesky 
parameter are positive and significant. 
  Finally, an attempt was made to address the structural and related nature of 
the profit and risk attributes of the contingent rating – stated preference experiment. 
Specifically, given the nature of the risk attribute (probability of half crop loss), it is 
possible to turn the profit – risk attributes into an expected profit – variance of profit 
equivalent, by utilizing the respondent-specific information on farm size. Again, 
because the experiment was not designed with this purpose in mind, these 
constructed variables turned out to be too highly correlated to permit identification 
of separate parameters in the linear indirect utility function specification. Instead, 
results from a model that only utilizes the expected profit variable, in addition to the 
two environmental public-good variables, and their interaction term, are reported in 
Table A2 of Appendix 2. As can be seen, expected profit enters positively in the 
estimated model, whereas nitrate leaching, soil erosion, and their interaction terms 
enter positively, consistent with the findings reported in Table 3 and Appendix 1.  
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study used a stated preference experiment to identify the preferences of corn 
producers in Northeastern Colorado with respect to profit, risk, nitrate leaching, and 
soil erosion attributes. While these first two are fully privately appropriable (and 
variables which are commonly assumed to explain producer behavior), the latter two 
have public good aspects in addition to potentially affecting farmers’ bottom-lines. 
The results suggest that most producers do, in fact, value reductions in soil erosion 
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and nitrate leaching in that they are willing to accept an irrigation system associated 
with less profit (or more risk) in order to reduce the levels of these attributes.  
The results generated through this stated preference experiment speak 
directly to the welfare implications of technological innovations, policy changes, 
and/or environmental regulation facing Colorado producers. By identifying not only 
the mean/median willingness to trade off environmentally damaging attributes with 
profits, but also the distribution of these magnitudes, this paper provides information 
that could be used to target production research and market alternative production 
systems, as well as predict the size of potential adoption populations; predict the 
response of farmers to various agri-environmental policy changes (such as the 
Conservation Reserve Program or various command and control policies related to 
soil erosion and/or nitrate leaching); or calculate the welfare changes/necessary 
compensation required to maintain farmers’ welfare in the face of such changes. As 
Poe (1999) points out, “such comparisons are not isolated academic musing, but 
instead have long been an essential component of federal policymaking” (p. 573).  
These results confirm the conclusions of previous studies that attributes vary 
across even a relatively small subset of producers (see, e.g., Foltz, et al., 1995), and 
that expected profit maximization is not always behaviorally appropriate when, say, 
choosing production or irrigation systems. Furthermore, it is shown that there are 
potential complementarities between the goals of public environmental policy and 
the goals of many farmers. Future research is needed to determine the extent that 
these effects are motivated by expectations over future environmental policy, 
altruism, building of social capital, or some other reason. 
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Table 1. Experimental Design of the Contingent Rating - Stated Preference 
Experiment 
   Survey  Version 
Irrigation  System  Attribute  V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 
1  P  40 30 40 40 15 30 
1  R  0.1 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.5 
1  N  14.5 39.5 72.5 14.5 72.5 14.5 
1  E  1 1 3 3 1 2 
2  P  15 15 30 30 15 15 
2  R  0.5 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.3 
2  N  72.5 72.5 14.5 39.5 72.5 14.5 
2  E  1 2 2 1 2 2 
3  P  30 40 30 30 40 40 
3  R  0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 
3  N  72.5 14.5 72.5 72.5 14.5 72.5 
3  E  3 1 1 2 3 1 
4  P  40 40 40 15 30 15 
4  R  0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.1 
4  N  14.5 39.5 39.5 14.5 39.5 72.5 
4  E  2 2 2 1 3 1 
5  P  15 15 15 15 40 40 
5  R  0.5 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 
5  N  39.5 14.5 39.5 39.5 39.5 39.5 
5  E  3 3 3 2 1 3 
6  P  30 30 15 40 30 30 
6  R  0.1 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.5 
6  N  39.5 72.5 14.5 72.5 14.5 72.5 
6  E  2 3 3 3 1 3 
Note: P = Profit in $ per acre above $100, R = Risk: Probability of losing at least half of crop, N = 
Nitrate Leaching in pounds per acre, and E = Soil Erosion where 1 is 2-3 tons of soil/acre/year. 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics For Farm/Farmer Characteristics 
 
Variable Description  Mean  St.  Dev.  Min  Max 
ACRE Irrigated  Corn  Acres  489.68  59.46  22 4000 
PROF Profit,  $/acre  99.47  4.68 5 350 
YIELD Bushels/acre  163.44  2.43  85  239 
OWN  % of respondents owning their 
land 
0.88 0.03  0  1 
YEXP  Years of experience farming  29.54  1.16  1  65 
YIRR  Years of experience irrigating  26.71  1.06  1  50 
EDU_H  % of sample with high school 
degree 
0.52 0.05  0  1 
WORK  % of sample with off-farm job  0.21  0.04  0  1 
CREDIT_Y  % of sample with credit 
available 
0.66 0.05  0  1 
CREDIT_S  % of sample with some credit 
available 
0.13 0.03  0  1 
SOIL_S  % of sample with Sandy soil  0.11  0.03  0  1 
SOIL_SL  % of sample with Sandy-loam 
soil 
0.41 0.05  0  1 
SOIL_L  % of sample with Loam soil  0.21  0.04  0  1 
SOIL_LC  % of sample with Clay-loam 
soil 
0.14 0.03  0  1 
SOIL_C  % of sample with Clay soil  0.06  0.02  0  1 
W_DEPTH Average  Well  Depth  118.50  10.37  10  780 
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Model 1  
(MNL) 
Model 2 
(Mixed Logit, No 
Correlations) 
Model 3  






































   (0.2145)  (0.3116) 
S21    0.1555 
     (0.8548) 
S31    -0.5935
*
     (0.3470) 
S32    0.8590
***
     (0.1780) 
LL  -486.3467     -423.5108  -417.3177    
LL(0) -867.8203  -867.8203  -867.8203 
# of Observations  1252  1252  1252 
# of Individuals  98  98  98 
Notes:  Std errors in parentheses. 
Models 2 and 3 estimated in NLOGIT 4.0 using 500 Halton draws.  
Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by 
***, 
**, or 
*, respectively.  
a The profit variable P has been re-scaled by a factor of 1/10. N is re-scaled by a factor of 1/100 
b The non-profit variables (R, N, E) are entered negatively (multiplied by -1). 
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Table 4. Model 3 Preference Covariance and Correlation Matrices 
 







27.40    
0.81 8.23   
-3.11 2.37 1.64 







1.00    
0.05 1.00   
-0.46 0.64 1.00 
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Table 5. Marginal Part Worth Values for Non-Profit Attributes 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 





1% reduction in risk (per acre)  $0.37  $0.48  $0.46  $0.50  $0.45 
1 lbs reduction in nitrate 
leaching  0.25  0.28 0.27 0.31 0.25 
1 ton reduction in soil erosion  5.47  6.84  5.01  7.06  4.38 
Note: Columns give part worth based on estimated model parameters only. 
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Table 6. Sample Share with Positive Non-Profit Attributes Preferences 
 
   Model 2 Model 3
Attribute  Uncond. Cond. Uncond. Cond. 
Less  risk  85% 92% 87% 92% 
less  nitrate  leaching 85% 95% 89% 97% 
less soil erosion  91%  97%  95%  97% 
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Table 7. Full-Information Simulation of Part Worth Distribution (Model 3, Full 
Correlations) 
 
Attribute 10tile  25tile 50tile 75tile 90tile 
1% reduction in risk (per acre)  $-0.26  $0.14  $0.44  $0.86  $1.66 
1 lbs reduction in nitrate leaching  -0.14  0.09  0.28  0.53  1.01 
1 ton reduction in soil erosion  -0.75  2.96  6.33  11.39  21.58 





th percentile simulated part worth using all parameter 
uncertainty in Model 3. 
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APPENDIX 1 – Environmental Interaction Results 
 








 (0.0687)  (0.0697) 
Risk (reduction)  5.7900
*** 6.3101
***
 (0.9596)  (1.0360) 
Nitrate Leaching (reduction)  3.5736
*** 6.9014
***
 (0.6063)  (1.2527) 
Soil Erosion (reduction)  2.0637
*** 2.7687
***
 (0.2541)  (0.3246) 
Nitrate Leaching x Soil Erosion    1.3859
***












 (0.3116)  (0.2477) 
S21 0.1555 0.3633 
 (0.8548)  (0.9618) 
S31 -0.5935
* 0.3150 




 (0.1780)  (0.2463) 
LL -417.3177  -413.3859 
LL(0) -867.8203  -867.8203 
# of Observations  1252  1252 
# of Individuals  98  98 
 
Note: Both the fixed coefficient on the interaction term and the Cholesky parameter S32 are 
statistically significant in Model 4.
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APPENDIX 2 – Results Incorporating Expected Profits 
 
( )=[(100+P) (1 )] (100 ) ( /2) ] E Profit Acre R P Acre R ⋅⋅ − ++ ⋅ ⋅  
22 ( ) [(100 ) ( )] (1 ) [(100 ) ( /2) ( )] V Profit P Acre E Profit R P Acre E Profit R =+ ⋅− ⋅ − ++ ⋅ − ⋅
 
 
Table A2. Estimation Results with Expected Profits – Variance of Profits 
 





b ---  --- 
Nitrate Leaching (reduction)  7.1857
*** 0.7248 
Soil Erosion (reduction)  2.7809
*** 0.1883 








    
LL 
LL(0) 
# of Observations 
# of Individuals 
-491.6271      
-867.8203      
1252 
98 
a In $1000 
b Coefficient not separately identified due to multicolinearity. 
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